Government Regulation: From Independence to Dependency, Part One by Samson, Steven Alan
Liberty University
DigitalCommons@Liberty
University
Faculty Publications and Presentations Helms School of Government
2013
Government Regulation: From Independence to
Dependency, Part One
Steven Alan Samson
ssamson@liberty.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/gov_fac_pubs
Part of the Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons, Policy History, Theory, and
Methods Commons, Political Science Commons, and the Public Policy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Helms School of Government at DigitalCommons@Liberty University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Liberty University. For more
information, please contact scholarlycommunication@liberty.edu.
Recommended Citation
Samson, Steven. “Government Regulation: From Independence to Dependency, Part One,” The Western Australian Jurist, Volume 4
(2013). 117-161.
Vol 4 The Western Australian Jurist 117 
 
GOVERNMENT REGULATION:  FROM 
INDEPENDENCE TO DEPENDENCY, PART ONE 
STEVEN ALAN SAMSON
*
 
 
Abstract 
What Robert Bellah calls ‘expressive individualism’ has led to 
unprecedented social legislation in America and expanded 
government employment since the 1960s, helping to produce a 
generous supply of public services, policy entrepreneurs, and 
clientele groups.  The legal scholar Lawrence M Friedman notes 
that ‘the right to be “oneself,” to choose oneself, is placed in a 
special and privileged position.’  As a consequence, ‘achievement is 
defined in subjective, personal terms, rather than in objective, 
social terms.’  When the claims of expressive individualism are 
considered in tandem with the increasing reach of the modern 
social service state, a case may be made for their mutual 
dependency. 
Today, the regulatory operations of central governments impinge 
upon virtually all areas of life, leading to widespread efforts by 
interest groups to have their vision of the good life implemented 
through law and regulatory oversight.  Much of the resulting fiscal, 
educational, and social intervention is largely invisible to the 
electorate but has led to greater dependency.  It also led the 
economist George J Stigler to offer a theory of regulatory capture 
when he observed that clientele groups develop a mutually 
beneficial relationship with the agencies that regulate their 
activities.  Indeed, when this becomes business as usual, few will 
call it corruption.  Thus, when examining laws and public policies, 
it is always wise to ask: Cui bono?  Who benefits?  As the 
Watergate whistle-blower, Mark Felt, put it: ‘Follow the money.’ 
This article is drawn from a series of eight introductory lectures and 
readings for a course on government regulation.  Part I is a revision 
of the first four lectures. 
                                           
*
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I THE STATE OF INDEPENDENCE:  LIFE, LIBERTY, AND 
PROPERTY 
The subject of this essay, government regulation, is contested terrain.  It 
is a busy intersection in a bustling centre of commerce where law, 
economics, property rights, and ethics converge and often conflict.  It is a 
place where interests and boundaries are often fluid and confused, where 
an honest surveyor or an impartial judge may be difficult to find, where 
any determination of what is at stake – costs and benefits, private as well 
as public – is part of what is in dispute.  Our best efforts to orient 
ourselves, to get the lay of the land, are too easily derailed or side-tracked 
as a result.  The loss of constitutional bearings is one of the consequences 
of failure. 
Let us start where we should wish to end and then work our way to the 
beginning.  Following the Great Depression and the Second World War 
Henry Hazlitt wrote a book entitled Economics in One Lesson.  The 
lesson is simply this: ‘The art of economics consists in looking not 
merely at the immediate but at the longer effects of any act or policy; it 
consists in tracing the consequences of that policy not merely for one 
group but for all groups.’1  While this may be the place we should wish to 
reach, the challenge is how to stay on the right path and recognise the 
landmarks along the way in order to reach what might be called equity: 
that is, justice for all.  Yet we are also fallen creatures.  We tend to show 
partiality – to ‘know in part,’ as the Apostle Paul puts it in 1 Cor 13:9 – 
and in the end may, out of envy or anger, not even wish what is good for 
all.   
                                           
1
  Henry Hazlitt, Economics in One Lesson (Arlington House, 1979) 17. 
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We need to prepare ourselves to think critically – that is, evaluatively – 
through repeated exercises in what Edmund Burke called ‘the moral 
imagination.’  This is not simply a matter of history, a law, economics, or 
philosophy.  The relevant material should engage our moral imagination 
in all of these areas and many others.  The writings of Henry Hazlitt and 
Frédéric Bastiat are a good place to start. 
As the principal editorial writer on economics and finance for the New 
York Times from 1934 to 1946, Henry Hazlitt took aim at many of the 
economic fallacies – what Bastiat called Economic Sophisms – that had 
been used to justify the Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal economic 
policies and what he called ‘capricious government intervention in 
business.’2  In his chapter on ‘The Broken Window’ in Economics in One 
Lesson, Hazlitt drew upon an earlier essay by Bastiat to which we will 
turn later.
3
  So let us begin with Bastiat’s political pamphlet, The Law, 
which was published in 1850. 
The confluence of law, economics, property rights, and ethics makes the 
subject of political intervention through regulation as wide as the world 
itself.  In the process of mapping it we shall draw a number of great 
thinkers.  Indeed, an intellectual genealogy links several of the writers 
will be touched upon in this essay.  Bastiat was a mid-nineteenth century 
economist and member of the French National Assembly who satirized 
the self-absorbed character of interest group activity in ‘The 
Candlemakers’ Petition,’ which proposed to block the sun’s rays in view 
of the harm it inflicted upon their trade.
4
 
                                           
2
  Ibid 180–1. 
3
  Ibid 23–4. 
4
  Letter from Frederic Bastiat to the Chamber of Deputies of the French 
Parliament, 1845, <http://bastiat.org/en/petition.html>. 
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Besides Bastiat, Henry Hazlitt also helped introduce the American public 
to the work of Friedrich von Hayek, a future Nobel laureate, whose early 
book The Road to Serfdom (1944) may be read in an abridged version.
5
  
In a later book, The Constitution of Liberty (1960),
6
 Hayek drew upon 
Francis Lieber’s 1849 essay, ‘Anglican and Gallican Liberty,’7 which we 
will touch upon in the next section.  Lieber, who at the time taught 
history and political economy at the University of South Carolina, also 
wrote a foreword to an early American edition of Bastiat’s writings.  
For these leaders and scholars, ‘life, liberty, and property,’ to use John 
Locke’s phrase, was of critical moral importance.  Thomas Jefferson’s 
wording, ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,’ in the Declaration of 
Independence of the United States of America is an excellent way of 
clarifying what is meant by property.  Property is, among other things, a 
place from which a Martin Luther, for example, could launch the 
Protestant Reformation by saying in good conscience: ‘Here I stand, I can 
do no other.’  In fact, James Madison referred to conscience as ‘the most 
sacred of all property’ and ‘a natural and unalienable right.’8  To claim 
otherwise is to make all of us dependent upon the power and whim of 
those in authority, which is the very definition of despotism. 
Let us carefully unpack Bastiat’s argument in favour of a state of social 
and economic independence – a part of what early Americans referred to 
                                           
5
  See Readers Digest, Readers Digest Condensed Version of the Road to 
Serfdom (originally published 1945, 2011) <http://www.iea.org.uk/sites/ 
default/files/publications/files/upldbook43pdf.pdf>. 
6
  Friedrich Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (University of Chicago Press, 
1960). 
7
  Daniel Gilman (ed), Contributions to Political Science, Including Lectures 
on the Constitution of the United States and Other Papers: Volume 2 of the 
Miscellaneous Writings of Francis Lieber (J B Lippincott, 1881) 371–88. 
8
  The Heritage Foundation, Madison on Property (29 March 1792) 
<http://www.heritage.org/initiatives/first-principles/primary-sources/madison-on-
property>. 
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as ‘self-government’ – so we may clarify what is at stake, politically and 
economically, when we examine the many and ever-changing facets of 
government regulation.  For the early portion of The Law
9
 let us engage 
in a close reading of the text, what the French call explication de texte. 
Bastiat begins with an expression of dismay: ‘The law perverted! And the 
police powers of the state perverted along with it!’10  One synonym for 
‘police powers’ is government regulation.  At the time the book was 
written, revolution was in the air.  In 1848 the monarchy had fallen and 
Louis Napoleon was elected president that year.   
Bastiat published The Law in June 1850 as a warning against continuing 
abuses of power.  Napoleon seized power outright the following year and 
briefly jailed Alexis de Tocqueville, a recent cabinet official who had 
earlier written the classic, Democracy in America.  By then, Bastiat 
himself had died of tuberculosis and Tocqueville, who suffered from the 
same disease, was forcibly retired.  The Law expresses Bastiat’s dismay 
that the world had been turned upside down: 
The law, I say, not only turned from its proper purpose but made to 
follow an entirely contrary purpose!  The law become the weapon of 
every kind of greed!’  The law, so to speak, has been conscripted or 
drafted into the service of the greedy.  ‘Instead of checking crime, 
the law itself [is] guilty of the evils is supposed to punish!
11
 
It is the age-old problem: Who will guard the guardians? 
As James Madison put it in Federalist 51:  
                                           
9
  Frederic Bastiat, The Law (Foundation for Economic Education, 1998). 
10
  Ibid 1.  
11
  Ibid. 
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In framing a government which is to be administered by men over 
men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the 
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it 
to control itself.  A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the 
primary control on the government; but experience has taught 
mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
12
   
Let us return to Bastiat’s argument. 
We hold from God the gift, which includes all others – physical, 
intellectual, and moral life.  But life cannot maintain itself alone.  
The Creator of life has entrusted us with the responsibility of 
preserving, developing, and perfecting it.  In order that we may 
accomplish this, He has provided us with a collection of marvellous 
faculties.  And he has put us in the midst of a variety of natural 
resources.  By the application of our faculties to these natural 
resources we convert them into products, and use them.  This 
process is necessary in order that life may run its appointed course.  
Life, faculties, production – in other words, individuality, liberty, 
property – this is man.  And in spite of the cunning of artful political 
leaders, these three gifts from God precede all human legislation, 
and are superior to it.
13
 
A legal positivist, such as John Austin, defines law in terms of the 
sovereign’s power to control people.  Bastiat, instead, makes a natural 
law argument: ‘[I]t was the fact that life, liberty, and property existed 
beforehand that caused men to make laws in the first place.’ 14   But 
Jeremy Bentham, the utilitarian philosopher and legal positivist, regarded 
                                           
12
  Jacob Cooke (ed), The Federalist (Wesleyan University Press, 1961) 349; 
James Madison, The Federalist No 51:  The Structure of the Government Must 
Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments (13 
September 2013) Constitution Society 
<http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa51.htm>. 
13
  Bastiat, above n 9, 1. 
14
  Ibid 2. 
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natural rights as ‘nonsense on stilts.’  Here the intellectual battle lines 
have been drawn. 
Bastiat next defines law as ‘the collective organisation of the individual 
right of lawful defence.’15  More succinctly, it is organised justice.  Its 
purpose is to substitute a common force for individual forces to protect 
God’s gifts, maintain rights, and cause justice to reign.  Bastiat then adds 
the proposition upon which his subsequent argument rests: If no 
individual can lawfully use force to destroy the rights of others, then the 
same principle applies to the common force. 
When the law exceeds its proper functions, it acts in direct opposition to 
its own objective, destroying it and annihilating justice.  It places ‘the 
collective force at the disposal of the unscrupulous who wish, without 
risk, to exploit the person, liberty, and property of others,’16 converting 
plunder into a right and lawful defence into a crime.  Two causes 
motivate people to do so: greed and false philanthropy. 
Bastiat observes that humanity has a common aspiration toward self-
preservation and self-development.  He adds that ‘if everyone enjoyed the 
unrestricted use of his faculties and the free disposition of the fruits of his 
labour, social progress would be ceaseless, uninterrupted, and unfailing.’  
But history also bears witness to a fatal tendency of mankind: ‘When they 
can, they wish to live and prosper at the expense of others.’ 17   This 
covetous sort of desire is the first root cause: greed. 
Bastiat then contrasts the origin of property with the origin of plunder.  
Property originates in the fact that ‘[m]an can live and satisfy his wants 
                                           
15
  Ibid. 
16
  Ibid 5. 
17
  Ibid. 
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only by ceaseless labour… But it is also true,’ he continues, ‘that a man 
may live and satisfy his wants by seizing and consuming the products of 
the labour of others.  This process is the origin of plunder.’  Here is where 
the law and the sovereign state are supposed to enter the picture.  ‘When, 
then, does plunder stop?’ he asks.  ‘It stops when it becomes more painful 
and more dangerous than labour.’18 
‘It is evident, then, that the proper purpose of law is to use the 
power of its collective force to stop this fatal tendency to plunder 
instead of to work.  But since the law is made by men and since law 
cannot operate without the sanction and support of a dominating 
force, this force must be entrusted to those who make the laws.’ 
This necessity, combined with the fatal tendency in the heart of man, 
‘explains the almost universal perversion of the law.  Thus it is easy to 
understand how law, instead of checking injustice, becomes the 
invincible weapon of injustice.’19  So once again the question arises: Who 
will guard the guardians?  How will greed be restrained? 
Let us now see where the logic of Bastiat’s argument impels us: ‘when 
plunder is organised by law for the profit of those who make the law, all 
the plundered classes seek to enter into the making of laws.’  Why?  
Either to stop the plunder, or to share in it.  As participation in lawmaking 
becomes more universal, ‘men seek to balance their conflicting interests 
by universal plunder.’ 20   This is a pervasive pattern in all areas of 
politics. 
To better understand this pattern it is useful to introduce René Girard’s 
concepts of mimetic desire and mimetic rivalry, which he developed in 
                                           
18
  Ibid 6. 
19
  Ibid 6–7. 
20
  Ibid 7. 
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the first chapter of I See Satan Fall Like Lightning, among other places.  
Drawing on Scripture as well as the great novelists, Girard finds 
expressed in this literature a dynamic process that drives human 
motivation.  We seek what we desire – the political philosopher Thomas 
Hobbes calls this ‘appetite’ – but we learn our desires from other people.  
Other people model for us what is desirable through their own desires and 
we derive our own desires through imitation.  This is what Girard calls 
‘mimetic desire.’  If, however, we begin to desire or covet the same thing 
possessed and modelled by another as desirable, we are apt to provoke 
mimetic rivalry.
21
  The accounts of Eve and Cain in Genesis 3-4 may be 
carefully read to see how desire is characterised. 
Although Hobbes did not use the word ‘sin,’ he saw something like this – 
the potential for anyone to kill anyone else – as a consequence of human 
equality in a pre-political ‘state of nature,’ which he described a state of 
war ‘of every man, against every man.’22  René Girard used the term 
mimetic contagion to describe this unfortunate condition, noting that the 
violence is usually purged only through an act of sacrifice, as when a 
scapegoat is identified, accused, and cast out.
23
 
Joseph Ratzinger, who subsequently served as Pope Benedict XVI, raises 
many of these same issues in an essay on the market economy and ethics 
in which he criticises Marxism and its reduction of man to a plaything of 
economic forces.  He writes: ‘let me merely underscore a sentence of 
Peter Koslowski's that illustrates the point in question: “The economy is 
                                           
21
  René Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning (James G Williams trans, Orbis 
Books, 2001) 16 [trans of: Je vois Satan tomber comme l’éclair (first published 
1999)]. 
22
  Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme and Power of a 
Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil (Michael Oakeshott ed, Basil Blackwell, 
1957) 82. 
23
  Girard, above n 21, 1, 19–22, 56–8; René Girard, The Scapegoat (Yvonne 
Freccero trans, John Hopkins University Press, 1986) 1–23. 
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governed not only by economic laws, but is also determined by men”.’  
Ratzinger continues: ‘Even if the market economy does rest on the 
ordering of the individual within a determinate network of rules, it cannot 
make man superfluous or exclude his moral freedom from the world of 
economics.’24  Man is a moral agent with the power to choose.  Life, 
liberty, property, and ethics are forever intertwined – whether through 
politics and the rule of law under God or through despotism and the 
strong arm of man. 
Thomas Jefferson and the other Founders believed in the rule of law 
under God, as may be seen in a careful reading of the American 
Declaration of Independence: ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident, 
that all men created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the 
pursuit of Happiness.’25  The word ‘unalienable’ means that these rights 
cannot be given away or sold.   
The story of Naboth’s Vineyard should also be read with that word 
‘unalienable’ in mind.  As the Apostle Paul wrote in Romans 8:38-39, 
‘nothing can separate [or alienate] us from the love of God.’  God bought 
His people with a price and established a comprehensive system for the 
administration of justice.  To understand the relevance of this story to the 
subject of this course, we should first recognise that Leviticus 25 
establishes the rule of law and a system of checks and balances regarding 
land tenure in order to protect against oppression and injustice.  
According to 1 Kings 21, Naboth was the steward of the property God 
                                           
24
  Joseph Ratzinger, ‘Church and Economy: Responsibility for the Future of the 
World Economy’ (1986) 13 Communio 199–204 <http://www.catholic-
church.org/ejtyler/catholic_life/RatzingerOnTheMarket%20Economy%20and%20Eth
ics%20.html>. 
25
  Declaration of Independence (10 November 2011) Constitution Society 
<http://www.constitution.org/usdeclar.htm>. 
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had given his ancestors, as established in Leviticus 25.  Just as the 
vineyard had been passed down to him, Naboth, in turn, held it in trust for 
his descendants.   
The larger context of the story is the reign of an idolatrous king of Israel, 
Ahab, and his wife Jezebel.  Beginning in 1 Kings 16, the narrative 
covers a remarkable series of events, beginning inauspiciously with 
spiritual adultery and human sacrifice.  Once the stage has been set, the 
story of Naboth begins with a covetous Ahab who wishes to purchase the 
vineyard.  This is forbidden under Leviticus 25 and Naboth sternly rejects 
the offer.  Afterward Jezebel finds him in a sullen mood.   
Here the words of the Apostle Paul are especially helpful to understand 
the dynamic that is at work: ‘I would not have known sin except through 
the law.  For I would not have known covetousness unless the law had 
said, ‘You shall not covet.’  But sin, taking opportunity by the 
commandment, produced in me all manner of evil desire.  For apart from 
the law sin was dead.  I was alive once without the law, but when the 
commandment came, sin revived and I died’ (Rom. 7:7-9). 
Thus when Ahab’s covetous efforts to persuade Naboth to break the law 
fail, sin revives – it rears up – in the heart of his covetous queen.  Jezebel 
usurps the king’s seal by misusing it to send instructions to the city 
fathers to elevate Naboth to a place of high honor.  For their part, the city 
fathers conspire with her to have him accused of blasphemy by a couple 
of scoundrels and taken out to be stoned to death (1 Kings 21:9-13).  
Thus sin reproduces and multiplies and fills the land: a good description 
of mimetic contagion. 
Here is a thought question: How does Queen Jezebel’s action differ from 
that of Queen Esther’s regarding the treacherous Haman in chapter 8 of 
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Esther?  Consider how many commandments Jezebel violated and abuses 
of power she committed.  God’s wrath against and judgment of Ahab and 
Jezebel for the murder of Naboth and their high-handed expropriation of 
his vineyard should be as plain as day to anyone who reads ‘the rest of 
the story,’ as Paul Harvey used to say in concluding his commentaries on 
the news.  This story is a microcosm of all the oppression that stains the 
pages of history. 
Returning to the property rules in Leviticus 25 it should be clear that, 
even in a case where someone should sell himself into servitude, the 
Bible provides no reason to suppose it is a heritable status that may be 
passed down through the generations.  The year of Jubilee proclaimed in 
this same chapter might, to use Madison’s language, be described as an 
auxiliary precaution since it was so clearly designed to restore what had 
in fact been previously alienated.  Thus we may discern a constitutional 
system of checks and balances even under the Old Testament regime. 
So we begin our study of the police powers, the regulatory principle of 
government, with stories about how power can be usurped, how 
usurpation may be resisted, and how political rulers may be subordinated 
to the sovereignty of God.  The question is always: Whom do you serve?  
The State?  Oneself?  Or God?  Joshua made his own decision plain: ‘as 
for me and my house, we will serve the Lord’ (Josh 15:24). 
II TWO CONCEPTIONS OF LIBERTY 
A study of the Declaration of Independence of the United States of 
America and the other American founding documents should lead us to 
reflect upon something remarkable: Whence came this idea of 
unalienable rights?  It cannot be found in the statute books and yet it runs 
as a thread through the history of western law generally and English law 
Vol 4 The Western Australian Jurist 129 
 
specifically – from St Patrick to King Alfred to Magna Carta and the 
Petition of Right.  The Founders cited the ‘Laws of Nature and of 
Nature’s God’ as the justification for dissolving the political bands that 
had, until that moment, connected them to the English Crown. 
Two years before the Declaration of Independence, George Washington 
chaired a meeting on 18 July 1774 that produced the Fairfax County 
Resolves, which articulated these principles and bore witness to the long 
chain of English liberty. 
Resolved, that this Colony and Dominion of Virginia can not be 
considered as a conquered Country, and, if it was, that the present 
Inhabitants are the Descendants, not of the Conquered, but of the 
Conquerors … that our Ancestors, when they left their native Land, 
and settled in America, brought with them (even if the same had not 
been confirmed by Charters) the Civil-Constitution and Form of 
Government of the Country they came from; and were by the Laws 
of Nature and Nations entitled to all its Privileges, Immunities, and 
Advantages … and ought of Right to be as fully enjoyed, as if we 
had still continued within the Realm of England …26 
One of the fundamental conflicts in politics is over the nature and 
relationship between liberty and authority.  Jesus reconciled the two in 
His concept of servant-leadership: ‘You know that the rulers of the 
Gentiles lord it over them, and their great ones exercise authority over 
them.  It shall not be so among you. But whoever would be great among 
you must be your servant’ (Matt 20:25-26).  Thus the perennial question: 
‘How should we then live?’ 
                                           
26
  Chapter 17: Constitutional Government: Fairfax County Resolves (2000) 
The Founders’ Constitution <http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/ 
documents/v1ch17s14.html>. 
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Institutions and entire civilisations are shaped by the choices people 
collectively make: what they are willing to give up in exchange for such 
other things as peace, security, and prosperity.  René Girard, who has 
written so eloquently on mimetic desire and scapegoating, believes, as a 
matter of Christian conviction, that we must confront the dark side of 
what we are collectively prepared to sacrifice.  Let us begin this task 
gently with a fable entitled The Dog and the Wolf collected by a Greek 
slave, Aesop. 
A gaunt Wolf was almost dead with hunger when he happened to 
meet a House-dog who was passing by.  ‘Ah, Cousin,’ said the Dog.  
‘I knew how it would be; your irregular life will soon be the ruin of 
you.  Why do you not work steadily as I do, and get your food 
regularly given to you?’ 
‘I would have no objection,’ said the Wolf, ‘if I could only get a 
place.’ 
‘I will easily arrange that for you,’ said the Dog; ‘Come with me to 
my master and you shall share my work.’ 
So the Wolf and the Dog went towards the town together.  On the 
way there the Wolf noticed that the hair on a certain part of the 
Dog’s neck was very much worn away, so he asked him how that 
had come about. 
‘Oh, it is nothing,’ said the Dog.  ‘That is only the place where the 
collar is put on at night to keep me chained up; it chafes a bit, but 
one soon gets used to it.’ 
‘Is that all?’ said the Wolf.  ‘Then good-bye to you, Master Dog.’ 
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The story’s moral is: ‘BETTER STARVE FREE THAN BE A FAT 
SLAVE’27 
This attitude is deeply embedded within the American experience.  A 
motto attributed to Benjamin Franklin reads: ‘Those who would give up 
essential Liberty to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither 
Liberty nor Safety.’ 28   The state motto of New Hampshire makes a 
similar point more rudely: ‘Live Free or Die.’29 
Liberty is one of the great themes of the Bible.  The fear of the Lord may 
be the beginning of wisdom, but where does the fear of death lead?  The 
author of Hebrews prays that God ‘deliver them who through fear of 
death were all their lifetime subject to bondage’ (Heb 2:15).  Liberty – 
freedom from such bondage – is ultimately a spiritual matter, but, like 
faith, hope, and love, has its material ramifications.  As the Apostle Paul 
wrote to the Galatians about an unavailing system of sacrifices: ‘Stand 
fast therefore in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free, and be 
not entangled again with the yoke of bondage’ (Gal 5:1 KJV). 
In the third chapter of The Constitution of Liberty Friedrich Hayek draws 
on Francis Lieber’s 1849 newspaper essay, Anglican and Gallican 
Liberty, to make a crucial distinction that could help dispel much of the 
confusion that has been infecting our political discourse.  Francis Lieber, 
who was a transatlantic cultural missionary, held the first chair of 
political science at what is now Columbia University following a couple 
                                           
27
  Charles Eliot (ed), The Harvard Classics Volume 17: Folklore and Fable (P 
F Collier & Son, 1909) 21–2. 
28
  Letter from the Pennsylvania Assembly to the Governor, 11 November 1755; 
Leonard Labaree (ed), The Papers of Benjamin Franklin (Yale University Press, 
1963) vol 6, 242.  The Statue of Liberty is inscribed with a modified version of 
Franklin’s original quotation; another inscription alludes to Aesop’s fable with a 
quotation from Woodrow Wilson. 
29
  New Hampshire State Government, New Hampshire Almanac: State Emblem 
(2011) <http://www.nh.gov/nhinfo/emblem.html>. 
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of decades of teaching in South Carolina.
30
   Writing from a consciously 
Christian perspective, Lieber drew upon a life of self-sacrificing 
experience – as a soldier left for dead in the Napoleonic wars, as a young 
scholar who operated the first school of gymnastics in Boston, founded 
the first swimming school, edited the first American encyclopaedia, and 
served as a Public Professor in the German tradition of addressing matters 
of grave public concern.  Lieber, whose own family was torn by the Civil 
War, drafted the first code of military conduct.  His writings were known 
and used by presidents from Abraham Lincoln to Theodore Roosevelt 
and cited by the Supreme Court. 
In his 1849 newspaper essay on Anglican and Gallican Liberty Lieber 
developed a contrast between two very different traditions of liberty: ‘one 
empirical and unsystematic,’ as Hayek put it in his commentary, ‘the 
other speculative and rationalistic – the first based on an interpretation of 
traditions and institutions which had spontaneously grown up and were 
but imperfectly understood, the second aiming at the construction of a 
utopia, which has often been tried but never successfully.’31 
Lieber and Hayek here summarise the great dilemma of modern politics.  
These are the two poles toward which we are drawn. The first relies on 
the marketplace of individual initiative, giving rise to what Hayek – 
following Michael Polanyi – calls ‘spontaneous order.’32  In the absence 
of a political safety net, people usually know that sufficient resources 
must be held back in reserve.  Such self-reliance and self-government 
resembles what Aaron Wildavsky called ‘resilience.’  The other side of 
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risk management – ‘anticipation’ – represents the urge to systematically 
cover every need and prepare for every eventuality.
33
  Taken to an 
extreme, the managerial state itself becomes a total package and an 
exclusive provider: what Hilaire Belloc called ‘the servile state.’  If we 
start with the definition of politics given by the political scientist Harold 
Lasswell – ‘who gets what, when, how’ (the subtitle of a 1936 book)34 – 
it is reasonable to conclude that politics can never be other than contested 
terrain.  
Lasswell gives us a definition that evades the justice described in 
Deuteronomy 18: ‘You shall appoint judges and officers in all your gates, 
which the Lord your God gives you, according to your tribes: and they 
shall judge the people with just judgement.  You shall not pervert justice; 
you shall not show partiality, nor take a bribe: for a bribe blinds the eyes 
of the wise and twists the words of the righteous’ (Deut 16:18-19 NKJ).  
By contrast, Lasswell’s definition leaves open only the questions of who 
will win, who will lose, and whose interests will be served. 
Lieber recognised that civil liberty is relative.  It can follow the 
decentralised, case-by-case, trial-and-error of the English common law 
tradition.  Or it can be rationally and deliberately crafted from the 
speculations of philosophers and the sort of false philanthropists 
mentioned by Bastiat into a system that may kill with kindness.  Civil 
liberty also waxes and wanes at various stages of civilisation.  For the 
ancient Greek, ‘man in his highest phase’ is truly human only as a citizen.  
‘Man is a political animal,’ as Aristotle put it.  He is a creature of the 
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city-state, which is the source of his identity.  But this is a totalitarian 
conception.  From the standpoint of Christian and modern liberty, the 
individual is the highest object and the state is a means to obtain ‘higher 
objects of humanity.’  The Apostle Paul answered the philosophers at the 
Areopagus in terms they applied to the polis: ‘for in Him we live and 
move and have our being’ (Acts 17:28).  As Lieber recognised, 
Christianity had demoted the state from master to servant.  Its purpose is 
to protect ‘chiefly against public power, because it is necessarily from 
this power that the greatest danger threatens the citizens.’35   Lieber’s 
admonition extended to that species of privatised public power Bastiat 
called ‘legal plunder.’ 
Lieber’s ideas about civil liberty and self-government, the title of one of 
his major treatises, come much closer to the vision of the Founders.  But 
such ideas are meaningful to people only as long as we are prepared to 
recognise and state what is usually unseen and unsaid.  Their moral vision 
of a self-governing community must be understood in the context of the 
Judeo-Christian civilisation that shaped them.  The United States 
Constitution of 1787 binds citizens together into a moral community.  It 
is also a political covenant among ‘We the People.’  The opposite of the 
self-governing moral community it assumes at the outset is one that is 
ruled despotically.   
In 1828 Noah Webster introduced the word ‘demoralisation’ into his 
American Dictionary of the English Language to express the great public 
danger that puts any such covenant as the United States Constitution at 
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risk.  Webster defined demoralisation as ‘The act of subverting or 
corrupting morals; destruction of moral principles.’36  
Speaker of the House Robert C Winthrop made the case for paying close 
attention to public morale in a speech to the Massachusetts Bible Society 
in 1849: ‘All societies of men must be governed in some way or other.  
The less they may have of stringent State Government, the more they 
must have of individual self-government.  The less they rely on public 
law or physical force, the more they must rely on private moral restraint.  
Men, in a word, must necessarily be controlled, either by a power within 
them, or by a power without them; either by the word of God, or by the 
strong arm of man; either by the Bible, or by the bayonet.  It may do for 
other countries and other governments to talk about the State supporting 
religion.  Here, under our own free institutions, it is Religion which must 
support the State.’37 
Let us turn again to James Madison – this time to Federalist 10 – to show 
how the principles of civil liberty and self-government were designed 
into the very fabric of the United States Constitution.
38
   He begins his 
argument in favour of the new United States Constitution by observing 
what he calls its tendency to break and control the mischiefs of faction.  
By faction, he meant political parties, interest groups, and the very spirit 
of partisanship or what Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn called 
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‘identitarianism,’ a mimetic ‘herd instinct’ driven by hatred and envy.39  
This is the sort of partiality or favouritism condemned in James 2:1-13.  
Likewise Micah wrote: ‘what does the Lord require of you but to do 
justly, to love mercy, and to walk humbly with your God?’ (Mic 6:8).  
Factionalism and favouritism threaten the enjoyment of life, liberty, and 
property. 
Madison’s argument is simple but elegant.  First, he notes that there are 
two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: remove its causes or 
control its effects.  Next, he notes two methods by which to remove the 
causes of faction.  The first remedy, to destroy liberty, he says is worse 
than the disease.  Liberty is to faction what air is to fire.  It nourishes 
faction but it is also necessary to political life.
 40
   Practically speaking, 
the art of state has usually meant the substitution of despotism for 
politics.  
The alternative, to give everyone the same opinions, passions, and 
interests, Madison considers impracticable.
41
  The unreliability of reason 
as well as the liberty we have in using our minds lead to different 
opinions.  The connection between our reason and self-love means that 
our opinions and passions have a reciprocal influence.  Still, attempts to 
standardise opinion, whether through control of media or education, are a 
favoured tactic of those who seek to impose uniformity or consensus in 
our more democratic age, especially if done in the name of the people, the 
general will, or the greater good. 
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Madison contended that the protection of the diverse faculties of men, 
which is the source of property rights, is the first object of government.  
This diversity ensures a division of society into different interests and 
parties.  Indeed, the latent causes of faction are sown into human nature, 
but it is possible to control at least some of the effects.  In the case of a 
minority faction, relief is supplied by the republican principle of indirect 
representation.
42
 
The case of a majority faction, however, is more challenging.  The form 
of popular government permits it to sacrifice the public interest to its own 
– in the very name of the people.  Once again, there are two options: 
either to prevent the existence of the same opinions, passions, and 
interests in a majority, just the opposite to the impracticable method for 
removing the causes of faction, or to render such a majority-by-consensus 
unable to oppress others.
43
 
But Madison is not finished with his analysis here.  Evidently in reference 
to the states under the old Articles of Confederation, he claims that there 
is no cure for the mischiefs of faction in a small democracy that consists 
of citizens who assemble and administer the government in person.  The 
reason is because the majority will usually feel a common passion and, as 
a consequence, provoke turbulence and contention.
44
 
Turning to the differences between a republic and a democracy, Madison 
notes, first, the delegation of the government to elected officials and, 
second, the greater number of citizens and area over which it may be 
extended.  The advantage of a republic over a democracy is that it allows 
public opinion to be refined and enlarged by filtering it through a select 
                                           
42
  Ibid 60. 
43
  Ibid 60–1. 
44
  Ibid 61–2. 
138 Samson, Government Regulation, Part I 2013 
 
body of citizens.
45
  Yet the notion of the presumptive virtue of a political 
elite soon began to favour out of favour.  The disadvantage of a republic 
is that intemperate, parochial, or sinister men may win the votes and then 
betray the interests of the people.  This being the case, Madison believes 
a balance is needed between the extremes of detachment from the people 
and over-attachment to local interests.
46
 
As David Hume recommended in his essay, Idea of a Perfect 
Commonwealth, Madison’s solution is to enlarge the size of the republic.  
This allows greater variety and makes it less probable that a majority-by-
consensus will invade the rights of the rest.  Enlarging the republic also 
permits the influence of factious leaders to be diluted.  Madison hoped 
thereby to create firebreaks that would confine the dangers posed by 
factious leaders to their original locations.  Among these dangers are 
religious sects that degenerate into political factions and a rage for (fiat) 
paper money, an abolition of debts, or an equal division of property.
47
   
The dangers that Madison detected in 1787 have remained with us to the 
present day.  The names of the parties and the particulars of their 
programs have changed over the years, but Francis Lieber regarded the 
underlying problem as what he called Gallican liberty.  ‘The fact that 
Gallican liberty expects everything from organisation while Anglican 
liberty inclines to development, explains why we see in France so little 
improvement and expansion of institutions; but when improvement is 
attempted, a total abolition of the preceding state of things – a beginning 
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ab ovo [from the egg] – a re-discussion of the first elementary 
principles.’48   
Gallican liberty is a recipe for ratcheting the growth of one overriding 
institution, the state, at the expense of all others.  Parkinson’s Law states: 
‘Work expands to fill the time available for its completion.’49  A variation 
on that insight might read: The state expands to fill the space that 
impinges upon its operations.  Robert Higgs discerned that the state 
expands in response to particular crises, such as war and depression, but 
fails to fully recede before the next crisis causes it to surge even further 
forward.
50
   The danger is that other institutions will languish while the 
state and its agencies expand and become a total package.  Anticipation 
and resilience are the two poles of risk management.  The question to ask 
is this: When the state comes to the rescue and politics becomes an 
endless shuffling and reshuffling of the deck of life’s ‘chances,’ will there 
be enough left in reserve to meet an unexpected emergency?  Path 
dependency has left the economies of the major powers highly vulnerable 
to the unanticipated while the scramble for legal plunder bloats their 
budgets and undermines their responsiveness. The possibilities for legal 
plunder are virtually limitless: a wide and open field. 
Here we should ask ourselves: How does such liberty – a ‘freedom’ 
Francis Lieber called ‘Rousseauism’ and ‘democratic absolutism’ – differ 
from what Hilaire Belloc called a ‘servile state’ in which man is reduced 
to something a lot lower than the angels?  Alexis de Tocqueville used the 
expression ‘tyranny of the majority’ to describe the danger we face in a 
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democratic age.  But it is merely a tyranny in the name of the majority.  
How can any faction, whether a majority or a minority, tyrannise the rest 
unless led to do so by ambitious ideologues, self-serving demagogues, 
and countercultural entrepreneurs?  What we have here, collectively, is a 
problem of the soul such as the Apostle described in Eph 6:12 (NKJ): 
‘For we do not wrestle against flesh and blood, but against principalities, 
against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this age, against 
spiritual hosts of wickedness in the heavenly places.’    The tyranny that 
can take root in our souls is a problem that poets and philosophers from 
Homer and Plato to the present have meditated upon.  As René Girard 
recognised, only the Bible tells us the truth about our sinful nature. 
III THE CONSTITUTION OF LIMITATIONS 
Matt Sieger tells a story about how Harold J Berman, a pioneer in the 
study of the interaction of law and religion,
 51
 began studying law at a 
very early age.  ‘Belief in law comes from early childhood,’ he said.  ‘A 
child says, ‘It’s my toy.’  That’s property law. A child says, ‘You 
promised me.’  That’s contract law.  A child says, ‘He hit me first.’  
That’s criminal law.  A child says, ‘Daddy said I could.’  That’s 
constitutional law.’52   
Once again let us do a bit of detective work and explore an intellectual 
genealogy.  Berman, a specialist in Soviet law who taught at Harvard and 
Emory, did his undergraduate studies at Dartmouth under Eugen 
Rosenstock-Huessy, a legal historian who originally specialised in the 
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Middle Ages.  Rosenstock, who devoted his life to studying the inner 
dynamism of Christian civilisation, anticipated the future development of 
a planetary society in which local customs and differences would retain 
their vitality.
53
  Our efforts to reconcile the interests of the group with 
those of the individual, unity with diversity, the universal with the 
particular, and reason with experience represent a major theme that runs 
through many of the key ideas upon which this essay draws.   
The medieval Battle of the Universals – the struggle between unity and 
diversity, the One and the Many, realism and nominalism – has 
considerable bearing upon the developmental stages through which the 
United States have been passing from the outset.  This historical dynamic 
is a theme to which we will return.  Let us begin by studying the 
historical context of the founding of the federal constitutional system of 
the United States. 
Virtually from the beginning of the colonial period early in the 17
th
 
century, the early American provinces or states were founded and 
governed according to compacts, charters, covenants, and even full-
fledged constitutions, as Donald Lutz has shown in a series of books.  
Many of these colonies drew heavily upon specific ecclesiastical 
traditions.  All drew creatively upon English common law, of which 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr, famously said: ‘The life of the law has not 
been logic; it has been experience.’54   
The New England colonies were especially innovative in fusing Puritan 
theological and political ideas about covenants into a coherent and very 
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practical constitutional tradition, continuing and further developing an 
equally practical, as opposed to theoretical, Biblical republicanism 
modelled after the ‘Hebrew Republic.’55   
Here we can detect one root that marks the difference between Anglican 
liberty and Gallican liberty, between the American Revolution and the 
French Revolution.  Among the noteworthy accomplishments of the New 
England clergy, as noted by Alice Baldwin and Ellis Sandoz,
56
 was the 
creation of a vast literature of sermons for distinctly political occasions, 
such as days of fasting, days of thanksgiving, elections held by town, 
states, and artillery companies, and public ceremonies that attended 
inaugurations and oath-taking.   
By the time of the Declaration of Independence of the United States of 
America, the Articles of Confederation, and the subsequent United States 
Constitution of 1787, America’s early political class had woven from 
many threads a distinctly American political language that has been 
passed down to us through the generations. 
The sum of all this experience was a constitutional system of limited 
government and powers, in which power is both divided and shared 
between three branches, multiple levels of jurisdiction, and the citizenry 
and their representatives.  Furthermore, sovereignty was not vested in 
either the state or the national government.  Indeed, the word sovereignty 
is not even used in the Constitution.  Instead, sovereignty, if we wish to 
use that term, appears to take form of a covenant that brings the various 
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parts into active relationship with the whole.  It is a covenant that brings 
each succeeding generation into dialogue within a perpetual corporation 
known as ‘We the People of the United States of America.’  This ‘more 
perfect Union’ is defined and delineated by a Constitution that Jeremy 
Rabkin believes to be irrevocable.
57
 
The purposes of government and the duties of rulers are set forth in 
Romans 13.  But verses 8–10 provide a critical context for understanding 
the first seven verses.  We are not to be indebted to others except to love 
one another.  Unfortunately, we rarely ponder the radical implications of 
this injunction.  What is just as rarely acknowledged is that these verses 
provide us with a working definition of love, drawn straight from the Ten 
Commandments and repeating a portion of the Great Commandment.  In 
fact, the Decalogue bears a very distinctive relationship with the English 
common law, which has been referred to as a ‘cradle Christian.’58  Alfred 
the Great opened his late ninth century law code with the Ten 
Commandments.  Nearly eight centuries later, some of the laws of New 
England, including the Massachusetts Body of Liberties, cited Biblical 
law by chapter and verse.
59
   
Today we take so much for granted that we miss the significance of the 
controversies over this precious legacy.  In an article entitled The 
Revolutionary Revelation, Sara Yoheved Rigler puts matters into fresh 
perspective by asking:  ‘What would a world without Torah look like?’  
Her description of an alternative New York that had never been under the 
Bible’s influence is certainly interesting for what is absent, although it is 
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hard to imagine a New York or even a New World in the absence of 
God’s promises to Abraham and his seed.  Modern advances in general 
literacy, the institution of hospitals and public schools, the drafting of 
declarations of human rights, and a widespread sense of the sacredness of 
life – all were once unthinkable and would be so today except for the 
seminal influence of the Bible.
60
 
The seedtime of the American Republic was marked by the emigration 
across the Atlantic of many parties to a lively debate that had been 
generated by the Protestant Reformation, which was further deepened in 
the British Isles as the Church of England subdivided into High Church 
and Puritan factions.  Separatist groups, such as the Pilgrims who settled 
Plymouth, spun off into their own independent congregations.  The three 
types of church polity – Episcopalian, Presbyterian, and congregational – 
resembled three types of secular polity – monarchy, the republic, and 
democracy – and could be viewed as distant cousins of the presidency, 
the Senate, and the House of Representatives. 
David Hackett Fischer’s Albion’s Seed identifies four different British 
folkways that were transplanted to America: 1) the Puritan refugees from 
the Anglican political-religious establishment; 2) the defeated cavaliers 
who had supported the King against Parliament during the English Civil 
War, along with their indentured servants; 3) the persecuted Quakers and 
German Anabaptists; and 4) impoverished masses of immigrants from the 
northern borderlands of Britain and Ireland.
61
  Separately and together 
they gave distinctive character to the mosaic of American settlement 
patterns and political bents.  E pluribus unum: It is out of such diversity 
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that the American founders sought to forge a unity-in-plurality.  
Consequently, a system of check and balances has grown along each 
political axis where power overlaps and is shared.  This originative 
diversity brings us back to James Madison and the Federalist Papers. 
Early in the 18
th
 century the French philosophe, Baron Montesquieu, had 
discerned in the English constitution a separation of powers between 
three branches of government – king, House of Lords, House of 
Commons – and had recommend that reformers in France follow this 
principle.  Madison took up this theme in the Federalist Papers, although 
his argument was built up through a series of specific essays. 
In Federalist 39, Madison focused on the specific division of power 
between the national and state governments.  Developing the principle of 
federalism, Madison showed how the division and overlapping of powers 
was built into the arrangement of national institutions, noting that 
Congress was divided by a national legislature, the House of 
Representatives, and a federal legislature, the Senate, in which the states 
and their specific interests were represented.
62
  
Turning now to Federalist 51, let us again engage in a close reading of 
the text.  By now Madison is expressing concern that an outward division 
of power is not up to the task of protecting against the abuse of power.  
What sort of abuse?  How about Bastiat’s concept of legal plunder?  How 
about the mimetic contagion that can result from envying one’s 
neighbours and coveting what they have?  At the end of Federalist 10, 
Madison gives a good theoretical account of the advantage of an extended 
federal system: ‘The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame 
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within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general 
conflagration through the other States…’63 
From these words it should be clear that Madison has deep concerns – 
ones that are not allayed by the simple architecture of a separation of 
powers.  To paraphrase, Madison opens Federalist 51 with a question: 
Given the inadequacy of a merely external separation of powers, how is 
the defect to be remedied?  His answer is that ‘the defect must be 
supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government, as that 
its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means 
of keeping each other in their proper places.’64  Thus the separation of 
powers must be supplemented by checks and balances. 
As he develops his argument, Madison elaborates upon this point.  Each 
branch or department of the government should have a will of its own.  
From this it follows that members of each major branch should have little 
say in the appointment of members of the others.  How can this be 
accomplished?  In a republic the power of appointment should be drawn 
from the same fountain of authority, the people, but it should be drawn 
through separate channels. 
Let us consider for a moment how the framers designed these channels or 
lines of authority.  Members of the House of Representatives hold seats 
that are apportioned among the states according to population.  They are 
directly elected by the local citizens of their home districts for a two year 
term of office.  Corporately they make up a national legislature 
representing all the people and have the responsibility to introducing all 
bills related to taxing and spending. 
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Until the ratification of the United States Constitution amend XVII in 
1913 during the Progressive era, senators were elected to six-year terms 
by members of their home state’s legislature, who, in turn, were 
themselves elected by the people.  Thus popular representation was 
indirect and states were given a voice in what James Madison called the 
‘federal legislature.’ 
Even more elaborate safeguards were built into presidential elections to 
ensure that the presidents were representative of all the people and that 
they had been thoroughly vetted.  The Electoral College is somewhat akin 
to a grand jury that is temporarily summoned for an important public 
service.  It is also akin to the federal system of electors that once chose 
the Holy Roman Emperor and resembles the College of Cardinals that 
assembles in Rome to choose the Pope.  Each state was obliged elect or 
appoint electors, usually prominent citizens who had some leadership 
experience, who could act as a political filter to sift and evaluate the 
qualities of the candidates.  Following the general election, the electors 
would meet in the state capitals and cast their votes.  A list of all the 
people voted for would be certified, sealed, and sent to the national 
capital.  There the certificates are opened about a month later by the 
President of the Senate in the presence of the Speaker of the House and 
the votes are counted at the opening of a newly elected Congress.   
Finally, the justices of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower federal 
courts are appointed by the president with the advice and consent of the 
Senate: that is, the federal legislature.  The idea in each case is both to 
represent ‘We the People’ through several different channels of 
expression and to filter the people’s sentiments, which can be both self-
contradictory and highly volatile at times.  
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The great security against a gradual concentration of power, Madison 
believed, was to give the heads of agencies the constitutional means and 
personal motives to resist encroachments on their authority.  Madison 
expected them to engage in turf battles: ‘Ambition must be made to 
counteract ambition.’  Thus their personal interest had to be connected 
with the rights of their office. 
But another question comes to mind: How does this self-interestedness 
differ from Bastiat’s legal plunder or the so-called ‘honest graft’ of a 
machine politician?  Here the political scientist J Budziszewski makes 
explicit what Madison only implies: ‘How can we make government 
promote the common good when there is so little virtue to be found?’65  
Madison suggested that self-interest could be used in the absence of 
better motives.  His idea is to arrange a checks and balances system based 
on opposite and rival interests so that the private interest of every 
individual may be a sentinel over public rights.  In the end, such filtering 
and channelling of self-interest are no substitutes for virtue.  
Unfortunately, all such contrivances can be gamed and, in the end, prove 
inadequate.  Ambition is not easily tamed. 
The political scientist Kenneth Minogue notes that, down through history, 
politics has been the business of the powerful.  ‘It was essential to the 
idea of the state, in all its forms, that it should be an association of 
independent disposers of their own resources.’66  This was equally true of 
the early American republic in which such independence was widespread 
and expandable.  But this is not a natural state of affairs.  It must be 
upheld and protected by common consent. 
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The danger against which we must always protect ourselves is the 
confusion of the coercive tools of despotism with the persuasive arts of 
politics through what Minogue calls ‘political moralism.’  It reverses the 
norms it seeks to replace: ‘Independent individuals disposing of their own 
property as they please are identified with selfishness and taken to be the 
cause of poverty.’ 67   This sort of moralism resembles what Michael 
Polanyi called ‘moral inversion’ and Roger Scruton calls the ‘culture of 
repudiation.’68  What Bastiat called false philanthropy today takes the 
form today of a state that can redistribute life’s opportunities and 
benefits.  To conclude, our contemporary dilemma is neatly summarised 
as follows by Minogue:  
Political moralism … takes the independence of citizens not as a 
guarantee of freedom but as a barrier to the project of moralising the 
world … Moralising the human condition is only possible if we can 
make the world correspond to some conception of social justice.  
But it turns out that we can only transcend the inequalities of the 
past if we institute precisely the form of social order – a despotism – 
which Western civilisation has immemorially found incompatible 
with its free and independent customs.  The promise is justice, the 
price is freedom.
69
 
Political moralism is the latest avatar of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s concept 
of the ‘general will,’ the exhortation to do whatever the state determines 
to be in your best interest.  The ‘general will’ is the command to which 
all subjects of the state must either submit or, as Rousseau put it, ‘be 
forced to be free.’  Bastiat’s false philanthropy wears many masks – 
Lieber’s democratic absolutism, Tocqueville’s tyranny of the majority, 
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Minogue’s political moralism – but, whatever form it takes, it tends to 
deny individual citizens standing and subvert their conscience. 
Returning again to the text of Federalist 51, we can see that Madison 
offers still another safeguard.  Members of each branch should be as little 
dependent as possible on those of the others for their salaries.
70
  Here we 
come to the great source of political corruption down through history: 
dependency and, its counterpart, clientelism.  In the opening chapter of 
the Godfather, Don Vito Corleone invites Amerigo Bonasera to be his 
friend.  What did the Godfather mean by that?  He meant that by 
accepting a favour, his protection, Bonasera would become his retainer, 
thus a minor member of his retinue.
 71
   
What Mario Puzo, the author, here describes is a feudal-style, 
paternalistic form of government that had been transplanted to and 
superimposed on a political system that, at least at one time, valued an 
independent citizenry: a people that could collectively stand on its feet 
like Martin Luther, who had made his famous statement, ‘Here I stand, I 
can do no other,’ when summoned before the emperor’s council, the Diet 
of Worms.  Corleone’s politics of friendship, as Paul Rahe has called it, 
lacks the cool detachment, the individual self-government, of those who 
wish to remain a free people.
 72
 
The political history of western civilisation is a perpetual dialogue or 
debate between the advocates of a politics of friendship – the cronyism 
that typifies corrupt political machines and ruling classes – and what 
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Rahe calls a politics of distrust.  To sum up the argument in favour of a 
politics of distrust, we might say that the virtue of independence requires 
a wariness toward those who seek out office, especially those who seek to 
worm their way into our confidence.  As Thomas Jefferson warned a 
friend, once the people ‘become inattentive to the public affairs, you and 
I, [and] Congress [and] Assemblies, judges [and] governors shall all 
become wolves.  It seems to be the law of our general nature, in spite of 
individual exceptions; and experience declares that man is the only 
animal which devours his own kind…’73  Homo homini lupus: man is a 
wolf to man.
74
  As Jefferson noted elsewhere, free government is founded 
in jealousy, not in confidence.
75
 
IV FAITH, FREEDOM, AND THE ABUNDANT LIFE 
Western civilisation – once known as Christendom – arose out of a 
combination of Greek learning (paideia), Roman law, and Biblical faith 
and justice.  The first of these elements helped shape our systems of 
education.  The second is preserved in the European civil law codes and 
international law.  The third element, the Biblical tradition, has been 
unfortunately neglected within an increasingly secularised order.  
Although its contribution is not well understood and has been deliberately 
ignored in Europe by the Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on 
European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community,
76
 
which govern the European Union, the Bible’s vitality is everywhere felt, 
as Sara Rigler has shown in a previous section. 
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Four decades ago Goh Keng Swee, the Singaporean defence minister, 
recommended that developing countries should convert to a demanding 
form of the Protestant religion in order to encourage habits of personal 
thrift and public honesty.
77
  He believed that it would result in great 
material progress.  More recently Zhao Xiao, a Chinese economist, has 
endorsed the idea that the spread of Christianity would be good for 
China’s economy.78  Although such recommendations make the adoption 
of Christianity sound pragmatically like a formula for material success, 
the far-reaching consequences of the Bible’s influence should not be 
lightly dismissed. 
On the other hand, we should not make the mistake of trying to equate 
godliness with worldly success.  Whatever link there may be between 
them is often too complicated for us to see a direct link at the individual 
level.  It is difficult enough to see even at the societal or cultural level.  
Yet there are still meaningful and often indirect things that can be said 
this connection.  For example, it seems reasonable to assume that, as 
opposed to a civil society that enjoys liberty, a society that is full of envy 
and strife of the sort the Apostle Paul describes in Rom 1:18-32 is 
unlikely to move forward from success to success.  A society in the midst 
of what René Girard calls a ‘mimetic contagion’ is most likely to seek 
scapegoats upon which it can purge its violence and then marginalise or 
otherwise dispose of its victims.  Remember the opening lines of James 
Madison’s Federalist 10: ‘Among the numerous advantages promised by 
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a well constructed union, none deserves to be more accurately developed, 
than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction.’79 
The Bible provides us with many illustrations of the mimetic character of 
violence generally, persecution in particular, and the need that the godly 
have for a place where they may take a stand.  And we should always 
remember that, as James Madison put it: ‘Conscience is the most sacred 
property.’  So here is some more food for thought: What should the 
faithful do when their rulers fail to make a place for liberty of 
conscience? 
Resistance to tyrannical actions takes many forms in the Bible.  We see it 
in the first chapter of Exodus 1 with the captivity of Israel and the threat 
of genocide.  But we can also see that the Egyptian midwives boldly 
resisted Pharaoh.  The Bible shows that God blessed both the midwives 
and the children of Israel.  Likewise, the first chapter of the Book of 
Daniel opens with four young men who respectfully chose to resist 
adopting the king’s prescribed diet in order to faithfully observe God’s 
dietary laws.  With the help of some men of good will, they were able to 
demonstrate the superiority of their own diet and were permitted to 
continue it in good conscience.   
Acts 5:17-32 illustrates yet another godly way of responding to injustice.  
Peter and the Apostles returned to teaching the Gospel despite having 
been ordered to the contrary and even imprisoned.  From this account it 
should be clear that firmness in defence of principles has a central place 
in the life of faithful service. 
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Now let us move the calendar to 19
th
 century Europe.  Early in 1859, 
Francis Lieber gave an introductory public lecture in 1859 that examined 
some of the threats to liberty in his day and ours. 
The advance of knowledge and intelligence gives to despotism a 
brilliancy, and the necessity of peace for exchange and industry give 
it a facility to establish itself which it never possessed before … 
Absolutism in our age is daringly draping itself in the mantle of 
liberty, both in Europe and here.  What we suffer in this respect is in 
many cases the after-pain of Rousseauism, which itself was nothing 
but democratic absolutism.  There is, in our times, a hankering after 
absolutism; and a widespread, almost fanatical idolatry of success, a 
worship of will, whose prostrate devotees forget that will is an 
intensifier and multiplier of our dispositions, whatever they are 
applied to, most glorious or most abhorrent, as the case may be, and 
that will, without the shackles of conscience or the reins of a pure 
purpose, is almost sure of what contemporaries call success.  It is so 
easy to succeed without principle!
80
 
With these Biblical examples and Lieber’s admonition in mind, let us 
now examine some of the practical consequences of a civilisation shaped 
by a Biblical heritage and some of the costs we incur in repudiating this 
bequest, just as Esau and the prodigal son spurned theirs by squandering 
it.  At the risk of oversimplifying the many contributing causes, let us 
carefully consider one scholar’s analysis of the economic consequences 
of Western Christianity, the kind of analysis that is typically narrowed to 
a simple formula, such as is found in Max Weber’s long essay entitled 
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.  In his article on the 
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‘European Miracle’ the historian Ralph Raico also addresses the question, 
‘Why Europe?’ 
One characteristic Raico notes is its relative lack of external political 
control.  He quotes Jean Baechler, who drew upon Montesquieu, to argue 
that ‘every political power tends to reduce everything that is external to it, 
and powerful objective obstacles are needed to prevent it from 
succeeding.’81  It should be evident that Baechler is recommending a 
system of checks and balances.   
But such a shorthand answer leaves only implicit what must be made 
explicit to a largely uncomprehending public.  It misses the leaven in the 
loaf.  Does the internal self-government associated with the Christian 
ethic perhaps have something to do with this relative absence of external 
guidance: this laissez faire?  Does political, economic, and moral self-
discipline reduce the need for an elaborate regulatory command 
structure?  Is politics, the art of persuasion, something that might flourish 
best in the absence of despotism, the technology of coercion?   
Drawing upon the work of Lord Peter Bauer, David Landes, Harold J 
Berman, and other scholars, Raico contends that the key to understanding 
the success of western economic development ‘is to be found in the fact 
that, while Europe constituted a single civilisation – Latin Christendom – 
it was at the same time radically decentralised.  In contrast to other 
cultures – especially China, India, and the Islamic world – Europe 
comprised a system of divided and, hence, competing powers and 
jurisdictions.’82  This is a point that is brought out especially in David 
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Landes’s The Wealth and Poverty of Nations.83  Here again what we see 
at work is a harmonising of unity and diversity, an institution of checks 
and balances, and reliance upon talents and treasure vested in ordinary 
people.  Raico’s discussion of Latin Christianity at least demonstrates an 
acknowledgment of the religious dimension of this story. 
Similarly, Francis Lieber attributed the successes of modern societies to 
the spread and development of Christianity.  Among many other scholars, 
Eugen Rosenstock-Hessy, David Gress,
84
 and Harold J Berman have 
looked at the Christian Middle Ages as a great wellspring of Europe’s 
political and economic development.  Kenneth Minogue notes that the 
kings of early Christendom were bound by oath to uphold an inherited 
body of laws that held their kingdoms together.
85
  Thus the rule of law.  
Medieval Europe was decentralised and yet a common legal order spread 
through Germanic and English realms.
86
  Thus Hayek’s idea of 
spontaneous order. 
Yet the literature on political and economic development, like so much 
within the social science fields, has long endured what Thomas Sowell 
calls A Conflict of Visions
87
 that pits off the constrained vision, the 
practical-mindedness of those who promote free markets and investment, 
against the unconstrained vision of social utopians who emphasise 
domestic political intervention and international aid agencies.  But what’s 
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in a name?  Such terminology can be maddeningly imprecise.  Sowell’s 
two visions are merely more recent handles for what Lieber called 
Anglican and Gallican liberty.  The ‘European Miracle,’ as Raico calls it, 
sprang from an experience that was first and foremost concrete and 
empirical rather than abstract and rationalistic.  To paraphrase what 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr said about the life of the law, we may say that 
the life of Europe’s development is also experience. 
Lord Peter Bauer, an adopted Englishman of Hungarian extraction, 
certainly epitomised the constrained, Anglican vision.  In Dissent on 
Development and other works, Bauer criticised the professional tunnel 
vision of social scientists who were so obsessed with numbers that they 
have neglected such factors as ‘[a]bilities and attitudes, mores and 
institutions, [which] cannot generally be quantified in an illuminating 
fashion.’88  The result is an ‘amputation of the time dimension.’ 
Today it is the occupational disease of bureaucracies and universities to 
elevate specialisation over general knowledge and reward a fixation on 
data that can be statistically massaged.  As Bauer observed of the state of 
academic economics:  ‘The historical background is essential for a 
worthwhile discussion of economic development, which is an integral 
part of the historical progress of society.  But many of the most widely 
publicised writings on development effectively disregard both the 
historical background and the nature of development as a process.’ 89  
Here is a nice illustration of the unconstrained vision at work.  Tunnel 
vision, anyone? 
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As early as the cusp of the twentieth century, the journalist E L Godkin 
complained that, in Progressive reform circles, laissez faire economics 
had gone out of fashion.  Furthermore, the Declaration of Independence 
of the United States of America was regarded as an embarrassment and 
the United States Constitution something to be outgrown.  In Soft 
Despotism, Democracy’s Drift, Paul Rahe cited Godkin’s lament while 
echoing Lieber’s and Tocqueville’s earlier warnings.  Rahe underscored 
that Godkin understood 
that those who repudiate the notion of natural rights abandon 
thereby the principles dictating that government be limited in the 
ends it may pursue and in the means it may employ, and he 
recognised that in the name of a largely imaginary public interest – 
divorced from a concern with individual interests and rights, 
inspired by Rousseau’s notion of the general will, and grounded in 
Hegel’s vision of an ethically satisfactory public life – such men 
would be apt to commit what would hitherto be recognised as 
monstrous crimes.
90
 
An earlier visual rendering of this point may be found in Francisco 
Goya’s etching, ‘The Dream of Reason Produces Monsters.’ 
Others have lauded the ability to vote with one’s feet – to escape major 
inconveniences if not monstrous crimes – as an additional safeguard: 
‘The possibility of “exit,” facilitated by geographical compactness and, 
especially, by cultural affinity, acted to transform the state into a 
“constrained predator.”’91   Residents of states that are not friendly to 
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business – high on taxes but low on returns for investment – often have 
more productive uses to which they can put their time, talent, and 
treasure.  The consequence, of course, is a shrinking tax base where 
emigration is high.  Of course, many countries – Lenin called Russia ‘the 
prison-house of nations’ – seek to hold onto such ‘human resources’ by 
denying them an exit visa, but this merely locks everyone into 
preordained failure, as the dissolution of the Soviet Union illustrates.  It is 
far better for a government to acknowledge that legal plunder is by nature 
predatory and then take steps to restrain and minimise it through the rule 
of law.  Such an alternative requires a public philosophy that maintains a 
healthy scepticism toward grand political schemes that seduce people 
with pie-in-the-sky promises. 
The constant element at work in all of these cases is the old demon of 
envy, a warped form of mimetic desire that seeks to destroy what others 
enjoy.  Envy is certainly one possible expression of mimetic rivalry.  
Raico turns to the work of the sociologist Helmut Schoeck who wrote a 
very influential study of envy.  ‘Perceived as a grave threat by those at 
whom it is directed, [envy] typically results in elaborate envy-avoidance 
behaviour: the attempt to ward off the dangers of malicious envy by 
denying, disguising, or suppressing whatever traits provoked it.’92  All of 
this unproductive behaviour, including superstitious attempts to ward off 
the ‘evil eye,’ tends to diminish everyone’s stature by breaking down the 
bonds of trust and community. 
In his book Envy, Schoeck, like Max Weber, offers a pragmatic analysis 
of Christianity’s influence to the contrary:  
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It must have been one of Christianity’s most important, if 
unintentional, achievements in preparing men for, and rendering 
them capable of, innovative actions when it provided man for the 
first time with supernatural beings who, he knew, could neither 
envy nor ridicule him.  By definition the God and saints of 
Christianity can never be suspected by a believer of countering his 
good luck or success with envy, or of heaping mockery and derision 
upon the failure of his sincere efforts.
93
 
This may seem like tepid praise but it acknowledges the vitality and hope 
inspired by a truly revolutionary revelation. 
Raico cites a few of the points made by Harold Berman in the first 
volume of Law and Revolution (1983).  In fact, Berman’s summary of the 
principal characteristics of the Western legal tradition – its relative 
autonomy, professionalism, specialised training, and scientific mindset – 
provides us with a good place to wind down our survey of the building 
blocks of our tradition of liberty.
94
   
In the second part of this essay, let us retrace many of our steps and even 
reverse course, chiastically, as we examine how that tradition has been 
put at risk by relinquishing and even deprecating many of the distinctive 
assets of western civilisation.  Berman himself witnessed and warned 
against these dangers decades ago.  His bill of indictment is severe: 
Almost all the nations of the West are threatened today by a 
cynicism about law, leading to a contempt for law, on the part of all 
classes of the population.  The cities have become increasingly 
unsafe.  The welfare system has almost broken down under 
unenforceable regulations.  There is almost wholesale violation of 
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the tax laws by the rich and the poor and those in between.  There is 
hardly a profession that is not caught up in evasion of one or another 
form of governmental regulation.  And the government itself, from 
bottom to top, is caught up in illegalities.  But that is not the main 
point.  The main point is that the only ones who seem to be 
conscience-stricken over this matter are those few whose crimes 
have been exposed.
95
 
What a picture he paints!  Five centuries after Luther took his stand on 
grounds of conscience and two centuries after Madison saw conscience as 
the most sacred property, where do we stand today?  Is the West facing 
foreclosure?  Might the corporation we call our ‘perpetual union’ be 
placed into receivership?  The attacks by critical legal theorists and other 
postmodernists on legal formalism now threaten to sweep aside rule, 
precedent, policy, and equity: 
In the name of antiformalism, ‘public policy’ has come dangerously 
close to meaning the will of those who are currently in control: 
‘social justice’ and ‘substantive rationality’ have become identified 
with pragmatism; ‘fairness’ has lost its historical and philosophical 
roots and is blown about by every wind of fashionable doctrine.  
The language of law is viewed not only as necessarily complex, 
ambiguous, and rhetorical (which it is) but also wholly contingent, 
contemporary, and arbitrary (which it is not).  These are harbingers 
not only of a ‘post-liberal’ age but also of a ‘post-Western’ age.96 
This contempt for law – antinomianism is the word for it – is the spectre 
that haunts the West today.  The question is whether the well-tempered 
engine of the American Constitution with its separation of powers and its 
checks and balances is any match for a post-Christian social order. 
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